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In the application domain of electronic commerce, biometric authentication can provide one possible solution for the key man-
agement problem. Besides server-based approaches, methods of deriving digital keys directly from biometric measures appear to
be advantageous. In this paper, we analyze one of our recently published specific algorithms of this category based on behavioral
biometrics of handwriting, the biometric hash. Our interest is to investigate to which degree each of the underlying feature param-
eters contributes to the overall intrapersonal stability and interpersonal value space. We will briefly discuss related work in feature
evaluation and introduce a new methodology based on three components: the intrapersonal scatter (deviation), the interpersonal
entropy, and the correlation between both measures. Evaluation of the technique is presented based on two data sets of diﬀerent
size. The method presented will allow determination of eﬀects of parameterization of the biometric system, estimation of value
space boundaries, and comparison with other feature selection approaches.
Keywords and phrases: biometrics, signature verification, feature evaluation, feature correlation, cryptographic key management,
handwriting, information entropy.
1. MOTIVATION
Today, a wide spectrum of technologies for user identifica-
tion and verification exists and a great number of the systems
that have been published are based on long-term research.
The basic concept behind all biometric systems is the idea
to make use of machine-measurable traits to distinguish per-
sons. In order to be adequate for this process, a number of
requirements must be fulfilled by a human trait feature, see
[1]. For our working context, the following four are of main
interest:
(i) uniqueness: the feature must vary to a reasonable ex-
tent amongst a wide set of individuals (intervariabil-
ity);
(ii) constancy (permanence): the feature must vary as little
as possible for each individual (intravariability);
(iii) distribution (universality): the feature must be avail-
able for as many potential users as possible;
(iv) measurability (collectability): the feature must be elec-
tronically measurable.
Biometric characteristics, which fulfill the above require-
ments, can be classified in a number of ways, for example,
see [2, 3]. One common approach is to divide into measures,
which are either originating from a physiological or a behav-
ioral trait of subjects, although it has been shown that every
process of capturing biometric measures includes behavioral
components to some extent [2]. In the context of our work
based on handwriting, we use the terminology of passive and
active biometric schemes to clearly point out the aspects of
the user awareness and cooperation.
Active schemes include all schemes taking into account
time-relevant information such as voice and online hand-
writing recognition, keystroke behavior, and gait analysis.
Such biometric features require a specific action from the
users and thus can only be obtained with their cooperation.
An example for this cooperative approach is the signature-
based user authentication, where the user actively triggers
the verification process by feeding the system with a writ-
ing sample. Passive traits like fingerprint and face recogni-
tion, hand geometry analysis or iris scan, as well as the oﬄine
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analysis of handwriting are based on visible physiological
characteristics, which are retrieved in a time-invariant man-
ner. These biometric features can be obtained from users
without their explicit cooperation, thus allowing identifica-
tion of persons without their agreement or even knowledge.
A straightforward paradigm for such an enforced verification
is the forensic identification using fingerprints. For potential
applications, this basic diﬀerence between active and passive
biometric schemes has a significant consequence, as each ap-
plication will have diﬀerent requirements with respect to the
subject’s cooperation. While, for example, in access control
applications, one can expect a high degree in user coopera-
tion as the desire of physical or logical access can be antici-
pated, this is not necessarily the case in forensic applications,
for example, for proof of identity.
From the perspective of potential applications, online
handwriting as an active biometric scheme appears to be par-
ticularly interesting in domains that deal with combined doc-
ument and user authentication, which today is handled by
electronic signatures. Nowadays, legal and design aspects of
electronic signature infrastructures are clearly defined, for
example, in the European Directive for Electronic Signa-
ture [4], and security aspects are handled by cryptographic
techniques. However, there still are problems in the area
of user authentication because electronic signatures make
use of asymmetric cryptographic schemes, requiring man-
agement of public and secret (private) keys. Today’s prac-
tice of storing private keys of users of electronic signatures
on chip cards protected by personal identification number
(PIN) has a systematic weakness. The underlying access con-
trol mechanism is based on possession and knowledge, both
of which can be transferred to other individuals with or with-
out the holder’s intension. Making use of biometrics for key
management can fill this security gap. A straightforward ap-
proach is to protect the private key by performing biomet-
ric user verification prior to release from the secured envi-
ronment, for example, a smart card [5]. This approach is
based on a biometric verification with a binary result set
(verified or not verified) as a decision to control access. A
physically secure location is still required for the sensitive
data.
In this paper, we will present a feature analysis strategy
for examination of a biometric system based on online hand-
writing analysis with a specific system response category, the
biometric hash, which has recently been published [6]. The
biometric hash is a mathematical fingerprint based on a set
of preselected statistical features of the handwritten sample
of an individual, which can directly be used for key gener-
ation, avoiding the problem of secure storage. Our evalua-
tion strategy for this system is based on three statistical mea-
sures:
(a) intrapersonal stability reflecting the degree of scatter
within each individual feature;
(b) interpersonal entropy of hash value components as a re-
sult of the biometric hash algorithm. This value is an
indicator for the potential information density of each
feature component;
(c) feature stability and entropy correlation to analyze the
dependency between measure (a) and (b) with respect
the contribution of each feature parameter to the en-
tire biometric hash.
These three measures are evaluated to analyze the given bio-
metric hash algorithm at a specific operation point, where
the contribution of our work is twofold. Firstly, we aim to
conceptually prove the concept of biometric hash generation
by analyzing the relevance of information carried by each in-
dividual feature. Secondly, we present a new feature analy-
sis based on correlation of deviation and entropy along with
evaluation results for this method. While typically in feature
selection problems, the aim is to reduce the complexity of a
given problem by separating features that carry no or little in-
formation, there is no requirement for dimension reduction
for the evaluated algorithm due to its low complexity. Our
aim is to find quantitative terms for the share of the resulting
value space for each of the feature components, which can be
used as a basis for an estimation of the achievable value space.
We will present a strategy for systematic, quantitative analy-
sis of feature relevance for generating a biometric hash value
and briefly discuss a limited set of related work in the area of
feature analysis and feature selection with respect to this spe-
cific biometric application. Further, we will discuss the prob-
lem of correlation and entropy of the feature space within
the scope of biometric hashes for several semantic classes for
handwriting.Wewill present results of evaluations of the bio-
metric hash using the method presented, which are based on
two diﬀerent test databases. For the first database with lim-
ited size, details will be presented and the discussion will be
summarized into a feature significance classification. In or-
der to validate the findings of the initial evaluation, the re-
sults are reviewed based on results of a second, extended test
containing writing samples from a large database consisting
of several thousand signatures.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we will
give an introduction to feature evaluation and a discussion of
the selected work in this domain followed by a discussion on
the distinction of handwriting in several domains like hand-
writing recognition, forensic writer identification, or signa-
ture verification in Section 3. Section 4 will briefly describe
the state of the art of biometric hash systems and introduce
our system concept of biometric hashes based on handwrit-
ing. In Section 5, we present an analysis scheme towards in-
trapersonal deviation of feature values, including test results
from our experiments. From the same test database, the in-
formation entropy as a measure for the achievable hash value
space on an interpersonal scope is introduced and the results
are presented in Section 6. Based on the findings in Sections
5 and 6, a correlation analysis is performed in Section 7, in-
cluding a relevance classification of the features examined. As
the initial test data set is too small to justify significant con-
clusions, Section 8 presents findings of applying this feature
analysis method based on an extended data set and compares
them with results from the initial test. Finally, we will con-
clude our work in Section 9 and summarize our contribution
and future activities.
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2. INTRODUCTION AND RELATEDWORK
The task of automated biometric user authentication re-
quires the analysis and comparison of individually stored ref-
erence measures against features from an actual test input.
Storage of reference templates is amachine learning problem,
which requires the determination of adequate feature sets for
classification. Feature evaluation or selection describing the
process of identifying the most relevant features for a classifi-
cation task is a research area of broad application. Today, we
find a great spectrum of activities and publications in this
area. From this variety, we have selected those approaches
that appear to show the most relevant basics and are most
closely related to our work discussed in the paper.1
In an early work on feature evaluation techniques, which
has been presented almost three decades ago, Kittler has dis-
cussed methods of feature selection in two categories: mea-
surement and transformed space [7]. It has been shown
that methods of the second category are computationally
simple, while theoretically, measurement-based approaches
lead to superior selection results, but at the time of publi-
cation, these methods were computationally too complex to
be practically applied to real-world classification problems.
In a more recent work, the hypothesis that feature selection
for supervised classification tasks can be accomplished on
the basis of correlation-based filter selection (CFS) has been
explored [8]. Evaluation on twelve natural and six artificial
database domains has shown that this selection method in-
creases the classification accuracy of a reduced feature set in
many cases and outperforms comparative feature selection
algorithms. However, none of the domains in this test set is
based on biometric measures related to natural handwriting
data. Principal component analysis (PCA) is one of the com-
mon approaches for the selection of features, but it has been
observed that, for example, data sets having identical vari-
ances in each direction are not well represented [9]. Chi and
Yan presented an evaluation approach based on an adopted
entropy feature measure which has been applied to a large
set of handwritten images of numerals [10]. This work has
shown good results in the detection of relevant features com-
pared to other selection methods. With respect to the feature
analysis for the biometric hash algorithm, it is required to
analyze the trade-oﬀ between intrapersonal variability of fea-
ture measures and the value space, which can be achieved by
the resulting hash vectors over a large set of persons. There-
fore, we have chosen to evaluate not only the entropy for each
feature, but also the degree of intrapersonal variability of fea-
ture values. Our evaluation strategy presented in this work is
based on application-specific entropy which is determined
from the response of the biometric hash function and in-
trapersonal deviations of feature parameters as measures for
scatter. An overview of the algorithm and the initial feature
1An exhaustive discussion of the huge number of approaches that have
been published in the subject is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore the
authors have decided to refer to a very limited number of references which
appear to be of significant relevance for the purpose of evaluating the specific
technique discussed in this paper.
set as presented in the original publication will be given in
Section 4.
3. DISTINCTION OF HANDWRITING
Three main categories of handwriting-based biometric ap-
proaches can be identified: handwriting recognition, forensic
verification, and user authentication. Handwriting recogni-
tion denotes the process of automatic retrieval of the ground
truth of a handwritten document; it can also be considered
as a specialization of optical character recognition (OCR).
Here, a wide variety of approaches based on oﬄine and on-
line analysis have been suggested. A comprehensive overview
of the state of the art in handwriting recognition can be
found in [11]. Determination of the identity of the writer
is not the primary aim in handwriting recognition, thus in
this category, systems make use of individual writing char-
acteristics in order to improve the overall recognition ac-
curacy. In this kind of systems, user-specific templates are
generated during a training phase in order to store informa-
tion about the writing style along with the writing semantic.
Based on this information, handwriting systems can be de-
signed in a way that a writer can be identified while writing
arbitrary text. This idea was taken over by researches at a very
early point in time [12]. While in handwriting recognition,
the primary purpose of storing user-specific templates is the
improvement of recognition rates, forensic applications use
sets of writing samples of known origin in order to compare
them with a handwritten document written by an unknown
or suspected person. The aim typically is to find evidence on
the originator of a handwritten document in court cases. Ex-
pert testimonies-based methods to analyze the individuality
of handwriting are generally accepted at court since many
decades, for example, since 1923 in the United States, and
research towards an automated writer verification system is
still an actual topic. For example, a quantitative assessment
of the discriminatory power of handwriting was performed
in [13]. By nature of forensic applications, the verification
does not require the approval or even knowledge of writ-
ers. In handwriting verification systems however, users en-
roll to the system with the intention of a later approval of au-
thenticity within a secured scenario. Typically, handwriting-
based biometric verification and identification systems use
one specific semantic class: signatures. Signature as proof of
authenticity is a socially well-accepted transaction, especially
for legal document management and financial transactions.
The individual signature serves five main functions [14]: not
only authenticity and identity functions, which can be pro-
vided by any of the biometric schemes, but also finalization,
evidence, and warning functions, which are unique to the
signature. Furthermore, handwriting allows the use of ad-
ditional semantic classes to the signature. Publications on
the use of writing semantics like pass phrases or symbols in
handwriting verification systems can be found in [15, 16].
For the overall security, this combination of knowledge and
traits shows advantages compared to the signature. Firstly,
the image of a signature is a public feature which is avail-
able to everyone holding a hardcopy of a signed document.
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This simplifies attacks by a potential forger, especially on
time-invariant features. Secondly, additional semantics can
be used to register several diﬀerent references for one user,
allowing the design of challenge-response systems. Another
aspect is the possibility to change the content of the reference
sample, which is important in case a biometric feature gets
compromised.
Handwriting verification systems typically operate in two
diﬀerent modes. In the verification mode, the system is fed
with a pretended identity and a writing sample and the re-
sponse is either a positive or negative match. Identification
only requires a writing sample input and the system will ei-
ther output the most likely identity or a mismatch. Besides
these two typical modes, biometric hashes denote an addi-
tional class of system responses. The following section will
introduce this category of biometric systems.
4. BIOMETRIC HASHES
Information exchange over public networks like the Inter-
net implies a wide number of security requirements. Many
of these security demands can be satisfied by cryptographic
techniques which generally are based on digital keys. Here,
we find two constellations of keys: keys for symmetric sys-
tems, where all participants of the secret communication
share the same secret key, and public keys, which consist of
pairs of a secret key (private) and a publicly available key.
While systems of the first category are typically designed for
eﬃcient cipher systems, the second type is used mainly in
digital signatures or protocols to securely exchange secret ses-
sion keys. In either category, we have the requirement to pro-
tect the keys from unauthorized access. As cryptographically
strong keys are rather large, and it is certainly not feasible to
let users memorize their personal keys. As a consequence of
this, in real-world scenarios today, digital keys are typically
stored on smart cards protected by a special kind of pass-
word, the PIN. However, there are problems with PIN; for
example, they may be lost, passed on to other persons acci-
dentally or purposely, or they may be reverse-engineered by
brute force attacks.
These diﬃculties in using passcode-based storage of
cryptographic keys motivate the use of biometric authenti-
cation for key management which is based on human traits
rather than knowledge. Various methods to apply biometrics
to solve key management problems have been presented in
the past [17]:
(i) secure server systems which release the key upon suc-
cessful verification of the biometric features of the
owner;
(ii) embedding of the digital key within the biometric ref-
erence data by a trusted algorithm, for example, bit-
replacement;
(iii) combination of digital key and biometric image into a
so-called BioscryptTM in such a way that neither infor-
mation can be retrieved independently of the other;
(iv) derivation of the digital key directly from a biometric
image or feature.
There are problems with all of these approaches. In the first
scenario, a secured environment is required for the server
and further, all communication channels need to be secured,
which is not possible in all application scenarios. Embedding
secret information in a publicly available data set like in the
second suggestion will allow an attacker to retrieve secret in-
formation for all users once the algorithm is known. The
idea of linking both digital key and biometric feature into
a BioscryptTM can result in a good protection of both data
sets, but it is rather demanding regarding the infrastructure
required. Approaches of the fourth category face problems
due to the fact that biometric features typically show a high
degree of intrapersonal variability due to natural and phys-
iological reasons. A key that is composed directly from the
biometric feature values might not show stability over a large
set of verifications. Secondly, if the derivation of the key is
based on passive traits like the fingerprint, the key is lost for
all times, once compromised.
To overcome the problems of the approaches of the last
category, it is desirable to derive a robust key value directly
from an active biometric trait, which includes an expression
of intention by the user. A voice-based approach for such a
system can be found in [18], where cryptographic keys are
generated from spoken telephone number sequences. As for
all biometric techniques based on voice, there is a security
problem in reply attacks, which can easily be performed by
audio recording. For key generation based on handwriting,
we have presented a new biometric hash function in [6]. By
making use of handwriting, an active, behavioral trait, and
additional semantic classes like pass phrases and PINs, the
system allows to change the biometric reference in case it
would get compromised. Instead of providing a positive or a
negative verification result, the biometric hash is a vector of
ordinal values unique to one individual person within a set
of registered users. Originally, the new concept of biometric
hash has been presented where the hash vector was calcu-
lated by statistical analysis of 24 online and oﬄine features
of a handwriting sample. Continuative research has lead to a
system implementation based on 50 features, as presented in
Section 4.1. A brief description of the algorithm will be given
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.1. System overview
The initial prototype system is implemented on a Palm
Vx handheld computer equipped with 8MB RAM and a
MC68EZ328 CPU at a clock rate of 20MHz. The built-in
digitizer has a resolution of 160× 160 pixels at 16 gray scales
and provides binary pen-up/pen-down pen pressure infor-
mation. Although it is widely observed that writing features
based on pressure can show a great significance for writer
verification, we limit our system to one-bit pen-up/pen-
down signals. This is due to the fact that our superior work
context is aimed towards device-independence, and a wide
number of digitizer devices do not support pressure signal
resolutions above one bit.
Figure 1 illustrates the process of the biometric hash cal-
culation. In the data acquisition phase, the pen position

























Figure 1: Process of the biometric hash calculation.
signals x(t)/y(t) and the binary pressure signal p0|1(t) are
recorded from the input device. These signals are then made
available for the feature extraction both in a normalized
(x/y normalization for determination of time variant fea-
tures) and an unfiltered signal. After feature extraction of
50 statistical parameters, these are mapped to the biometric
hash by the interval mapping process, making use of a user-
specific interval matrix (IM). The IM is determined during
enrollment, and the algorithm for this will be presented in
Section 4.3.
4.2. Feature parameters
The proceeding of obtaining a hash vector by interval map-
ping requires the utilization of a fixed number of scalar fea-
ture values, which are computed by statistical analysis of the
sampled physical signals. A comprehensive overview of rele-
vant features used in publications on signature verification
can be found in [19, 20]. Due to the resource and hard-
ware limitations on a PDA platform like the one used in
our project, we have based our initial research on biometric
hash on 24 statistical features, which have been extended for
the work presented in this paper to 50 parameters shown in
Table 1. To satisfy the need to have a fixed number of compo-
nents, these features are either based on a global analysis of
signals or on partitioning to a fixed number of subsets, which
was chosen intuitively.
4.3. Interval matrix determination
The IM is a matrix with a dimension of K × 2, where K de-
notes the number of feature components that is taken into
account, as listed in Table 1. Each of the i ∈ [1, . . . ,K] two-
dimensional vector components consists of an interval length
∆Ii and an oﬀset value Ωi. The interval length and oﬀset val-
ues are determined for each user during an enrollment pro-
cess consisting of j ∈ [1, . . . ,N] writing samples for each
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(3)
which is, for each of the j features, an initial interval
[IInitLow, . . . , IInitHigh] with an initial interval length ∆IInit is
determined. Then the eﬀective interval [ILow, . . . , IHigh] is de-
fined by the initial interval, with the left boundary IInitLow re-
duced by t∗i ∆IInit (or 0, if the term becomes negative) and the
right boundary IInitHigh increased by t∗i ∆IInit.
The parameter-specific tolerance factor ti is introduced to
compensate for the intravariability of each feature parameter.
Factor values for ti are dependent on the number of samples
per enrollment N and have been estimated in separate in-
trapersonal variability tests as described in Section 5. Table 2
presents values for ti which have been estimated for each of
the parameters ni based on an enrollment size of N = 6.
All feature parameters are of nonnegative integer type
and test values will be rounded accordingly. Thus the eﬀec-
tive interval length ∆Ii can be written as
∆Ii = IHigh + 0.5−
(
ILow − 0.5
) = IHigh − ILow + 1, (4)
whereas the interval oﬀset value Ωi is defined as
Ωi = ILow MOD∆II . (5)










4.4. Hash value computation
The hash value computation is based on a mapping of each
of the feature parameters of a test sample to an integer value
scale. Due to the nature of the determination of the interval
matrix, all possible values v1 and v2 within the extended in-
terval [ILow, . . . , IHigh] for each of the i ∈ [1, . . . ,K] features



































That is, all given v1 and v2 within the extended interval lead
to identical integer quotients, whereas values below or above
the interval border lead to diﬀerent integer values. Thus, we
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Table 1: Feature parameters for the biometric hash calculation.
Parameter name Index Param. Description
Segment count 1 n1 Number of pen-down events
Duration 2 n2 Total writing duration in ms
Sample count 3 n3 Total number of samples
Maximum count 4 n4 Sum of local maximum in x- and y-signals
Aspect ratio 5 n5 x/y ratio of the writing image times 1000
Pen-up pen-down ratio 6 n6 Ratio of total pen-up and total pen-down times multiplied by 1000
X-integral 7 n7 Total area covered by the absolute x-signal
Y-integral 8 n8 Total area covered by the absolute y-signal
X-velocity 9 n9 Average absolute writing velocity in x-direction
Y-velocity 10 n10 Average absolute writing velocity in y-direction
X-acceleration 11 n11 Average absolute writing acceleration in x-direction
Y-acceleration 12 n12 Average absolute writing acceleration in y-direction
X-distribution velocity 13 n13 Maximum x-distribution Max(x)−Min(x) over total writing time
Y-distribution velocity 14 n14 Maximum y-distribution Max(y)−Min(y) over total writing time
Segmented x-areas 15–19 n15–n19 x-integral of 5 segments of equal length TTotal/5
Segmented y-areas 20–24 n20–n24 y-integral of 5 segments of equal length TTotal/5
Path length 25 n25 Total path length of writing trace in pixel
Delta X 26 n26 Total horizontal image expansion
Delta Y 27 n27 Total vertical image expansion
Eﬀective average speed 28 n28 Ratio of total writing path length and total writing time
Pixel count 12-segment 29–40 n29–n40 Number of pixels in each 4 by 3 sector
Cumulated integral error x 41 n41 Sum of absolute x-diﬀerences between discrete integration rectangle versus trapeze
Cumulated integral error y 42 n42 Sum of absolute y-diﬀerences between discrete integration rectangle versus trapeze
Integral error sign x 43 n43 Eﬀective sign of feature 41
Integral error sign y 44 n44 Eﬀective sign of feature 42
Cumulated radiant 45 n45 Radiant of cumulated x/y from upper left corner of image
Average radiant 46 n46 Average radiant of all x/y sample points from upper left corner of image
Cumulated distance 47 n47 Distance t of cumulated x/y from upper left corner of image
Average distance 48 n48 Average distance of all x/y sample points from upper left corner of image
Average x-position 49 n49 Average of all x-sample values
Average y-position 50 n50 Average of all y-sample values
write the hash function h for each feature parameter fi of a











Thus, the resulting hash vector consists of K components of
integer values.
5. INTRAPERSONAL SCATTER: FEATURE DEVIATION
One major problem in using biometric features to directly
derive hash values is the trade-oﬀ between natural intra-
personal variability of feature values between several samples
of an individual user and the requirement to have a persis-
tent value in the biometric hash. A trivial example for this
dilemma is the total writing time of a signature. This feature
is very straightforward to calculate and, therefore, very often
used in verification systems with limited resources like digital
signal processor chips [21]. Amongst first-order features, it
shows a rather stable intrapersonal behavior. If, for example,
a natural intrapersonal variance of 5% is observed, the aver-
age signature duration of a subject is 5 seconds; all duration
values in [4.75, . . . , 5.25] seconds should be acceptable to au-
thenticate this particular feature. Depending on the sampling
rate of the digitizer device used for the signature capture, this
can lead to a great number of acceptable discrete values, a
sampling rate of 10milliseconds would lead to 51 possible
values that would lead to a positive result. Thus in order to
achieve stable hash values, all features must be mapped into
a value space, using, for example, an interval-mapping algo-
rithm, as described in Section 4. The evaluation of intrap-
ersonal deviations of features was performed by measuring
the average deviations between enrollment and test sets of
enrollments for a given test database, and details of the test
procedure are given below.
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Table 2: Tolerance values estimation for N = 6.
Parameter name ti(%) ni
Segment count 565 n1
Duration 1400 n2
Sample count 590 n3
Maximum count 715 n4
Aspect ratio 635 n5







X-distribution velocity 685 n13
Y-distribution velocity 765 n14
Segmented x-area 1 1800 n15
Segmented x-area 2 1085 n16
Segmented x-area 3 595 n17
Segmented x-area 4 860 n18
Segmented x-area 5 1010 n19
Segmented y-area 1 1060 n20
Segmented y-area 2 1030 n21
Segmented y-area 3 820 n22
Segmented y-area 4 760 n23
Segmented y-area 5 635 n24
Path length 655 n25
Delta X 630 n26
Delta Y 710 n27
Eﬀective average speed 750 n28
Pixel count segment 1/12 1065 n29
Pixel count segment 2/12 565 n30
Pixel count segment 3/12 1060 n31
Pixel count segment 4/12 470 n32
Pixel count segment 5/12 460 n33
Pixel count segment 6/12 1070 n34
Pixel count segment 7/12 495 n35
Pixel count segment 8/12 565 n36
Pixel count segment 9/12 320 n37
Pixel count segment 10/12 825 n38
Pixel count segment 11/12 760 n39
Pixel count segment 12/12 690 n40
Cumulated integral error x 615 n41
Cumulated integral error y 340 n42
Integral error sign x 0 n43
Integral error sign y 0 n44
Cumulated radiant 495 n45
Average radiant 395 n46
Cumulated distance 840 n47
Average distance 1010 n48
Average x-position 915 n49
Average y-position 1045 n50









































































































Figure 2: Sorted histogram of average deviation di in feature values of signatures with e = 6 in initial test.
This initial test was based on 10 users with 10 writing
samples of 5 semantic classes. All users are familiar with com-
puter devices and the writing samples were collected during 2
enrollment sessions, where the second recording session was
at least two weeks after the first. As mentioned in the motiva-
tion, additional evaluations based on extended databases are
described in Section 8 and will be concluded with a compar-
ison of test results.
Our tests for evaluation of the intravariability have been
performed separately for the following 5 diﬀerent semantic
classes:
(i) signature;
(ii) fixed PIN (all users were asked to write the same PIN
8710);
(iii) arbitrary pass phrase (user may choose any combina-
tion of words/numbers);
(iv) the German word “Sauerstoﬀgefa¨ß” for all users;
(v) arbitrary specific symbol (the user may use a short
sketch of his choice).
The tests have been performed based on all 10 users for each
feature and each semantic class according to the following
instructions:
(1) for each of the semantic classes s ∈ [signature, PIN, pass
phrase, fixed word, and user-defined symbol],
(a) for each of the g ∈ [1, . . . , 10] users ug and for each
of the i ∈ [1, . . . , 50] features ni,
(i) divide each set of 10 samples into all possible
combinations of e enrollment samples and 10− e
test samples;
(b) for each of the e enrollments and each of the 10 − e
tests, calculate the following deviation:
(i) determine minimum and maximum enrollment
values veMin and veMax from all e samples;
(ii) determine average enrollment value µe = veMin +
(veMax − veMin)/2;
(iii) determine minimum and maximum values tMin
and tMax from the actual test sample;
(iv) calculatemaximum relative deviation de from av-
erage enrollment value µe:
de =MAX
( ∣∣µe − tMin∣∣∣∣µe − veMin∣∣ ,
∣∣µe − tMax∣∣∣∣µe − veMax∣∣
)
; (9)
(v) average de of all enrollments of all users and se-
mantic class s into average feature deviation di,s.
Figure 2 presents the histogram for the averaged deviations
for each of the features numbers i of this test for an enroll-
ment size of e = 6 samples and the semantic signature.
The two features n43 and n44 (integration error sign for
x and y signals) resulted in a feature value of 0 for all tests,
thus the relative deviation cannot be determined. We observe
a relatively strong increase in deviations between feature n15
and n42. Further, the gradient significantly increases for all
features right of n17. In order to determine particularly low
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and high variance features, we classify features of the first
category into low, the second into high, and all remaining
into medium intravariance. We get the classification of low
intravariance and high intravariance features in Table 3 and
Table 4, respectively.
There are two interesting observations. The three features
with the lowest intravariability are in the same feature cate-
gory as n34, being amongst the three features with the highest
variability. All these features are calculated by calculating the
number of pixels of the writing trace in segmented images,
which are obtained by dividing the signature image into 4×3
equal-sized images according to Figure 3.
While the two upper, leftmost areas show a high stability,
the pixel count in area 6 is varying strongly. The other inter-
esting observation is the ranking and n25 (trace path length)
and n2 (total writing duration). Both features are time- or
sequence-variant and are commonly known as rather reli-
able features for verification. Apparently these features are
not significantly stable in the biometric hash generation and
furthermore, it is interesting to see that in amongst the 8 pa-
rameters of the low-variability class, only one online feature
(n8, Y-Integral) can be found. An explanation for this obser-
vation can be the global nature of features, which is a prereq-
uisite for the calculation of the biometric hash as described
in Section 4. Furthermore, the observation that segmented
features in the upper left areas show a lower intrapersonal
variance can be explained by the natural left-to-right writing
orientation in Latin handwriting.
6. FEATURE ENTROPY
In Section 5, we have discussed aspects of intrapersonal vari-
ability of biometric features based on handwriting. Intraper-
sonal variability can be interpreted as a measure of instability
of a feature parameter. For biometric systems, feature stabil-
ity is a fundamental requirement; therefore, relevant features
should show a low intrapersonal deviation. Besides the sta-
bility, the individuality of features needs to be ensured. For
the evaluation of individually, we present an entropy analy-
sis in this section. Both characteristics together will then be
combined into an indicator for the suitability of a particular
feature for the biometric hash in the Section 7.
Information entropy had been introduced by Shannon
more than half a century ago [22, 23], and is a measure for
the information density within a set of values with known
occurrence probabilities. Knowledge of the information en-
tropy is the basis for design of several eﬃcient data coding
and compression techniques like the Huﬀman code [24] as
it describes the eﬀective amount of information contained
in a finite set. This question of eﬀective information content
is directly related to the uniqueness of a biometric feature,
which motivated the authors to perform an entropy analysis
for each feature of the biometric hash.
In the biometric hash scenario as described in Section 4,
the interpersonal variability has a direct impact on the hash
value space. For features with a low interpersonal variabil-
ity, it can be expected that many users will have similar or
Table 3: Features showing a low intravariability for N = 6 with the
semantic class being signature.
Feature Description Deviation (%)
n29 Pixel count 12-segment (1/12) 32
n30 Pixel count 12-segment (2/12) 51.9
n40 Pixel count 12-segment (12/12) 60.4
n5 Aspect ratio 61.5
n20 Segmented y-area 1/5 64.2
n23 Segmented y-area 4/5 64.6
n8 Y-integral 67.9
n15 Segmented x-area 1/5 68.7
Table 4: Features showing a high intrapersonal variability for N =
6 with the semantic class being signature.
Feature Description Deviation (%)
n10 Y-velocity 153.2
n11 X-acceleration 163.3
n24 Segmented y-area 5 171.8
n50 Average y-position 179.2
n28 Eﬀective average speed 180.9
n41 Cumulated integral error x 182.1
n4 Maximum count 193.1
n26 Delta X 204.6
n13 X-distribution velocity 206
n6 Pen-up pen-down ratio 215.7
n25 Path length 219.1
n7 X-integral 230.2
n47 Cumulated distance 238.2
n48 Average distance 256.9
n16 Segmented x-area 2/5 269.7
n49 Average x-position 293.3
n34 Pixel Count 12-segment 6/12 295.2
n2 Duration 306.2
n19 Segmented x-area 5/5 368.8
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
Figure 3: Segmentation of the writing image into 12 equal-sized
areas.
identical hash values, whereas a high interpersonal variability
indicates a large potential value space. Consequently, we con-
sider the feature entropy of responses of the biometric hash
function as a measure to which degree the potential value
space of the hashing function is actually occupied by real-
world hash values. Our aim is to estimate to which extend















































































































Figure 4: Feature entropy of initial test relative to H(n1) = 1.93 with the semantic being signature.
each biometric feature is capable of representing individual
values to build the biometric hash. For this estimation, we
apply the general formula to determine the entropy H of a
system X consisting of k ∈ [1, . . . ,n] states with a respective
occurrence probability of pk, in our context, each of the n
states represents the occurrence of value vk in the response
of the biometric hash system, being one of the unique values
that have been observed over all T test passes for each feature.
Thus the occurrence probability for feature value vk writes to




pk · log2 pk. (10)
In this part of our analysis, we are mainly interested in a
global quantitative comparison of information capacity of
each of the features, as described in Section 4. In order to do
so, the interpersonal feature entropy for the same test set as
described in Section 5 has been determined. For a classifica-
tion, all entropy values have been normalized to the highest
entropy occurrence, which was found for feature n1 with an
entropy of H(n1) = 1.93.
Figure 4 shows the result of the entropy test, and it vi-
sualizes the information content. For a number of features,
the hash value was the same for all users in all verification
tests. These cases lead to an entropy of zero, thus n15 through
n24, n28 through n40, and n42 are zero and do not con-
tribute any user-specific information in the biometric hash
scenario. Amongst the remaining nonzero entropy features,
five show entropy significantly higher than 50%; these are
n1, n3, n26, n45, and n46. The remaining features show rela-
tively low entropy in the range between 7% and slightly above
30%. The clear boundary above 50% motivates our classi-
fication into high-entropy (greater than 50%), low-entropy
(greater than 0%, equal to 50%), and zero-entropy features.
Thus in summary, the entropy test resulted in 5 relevant,
high-entropy, 20 low-entropy, and 25 zero-entropy features.
7. FEATURE STABILITY AND ENTROPY CORRELATION
In Sections 6 and 7, we have presented two feature evalua-
tion measures for biometric hashes: intrapersonal deviation
as a term of instability and intrapersonal entropy as a mea-
surement for information density. In order to have a quan-
titative measure for the trade-oﬀ between deviation and sta-
bility, we introduce the feature correlation Ci as the product
between the relative feature stability Si and the feature en-
tropy Hi = H(ni) for one specific semantic class as per the





di, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K]
))
, (11)
where di denotes average feature deviation (see Section 5),
Ci = Si ·Hi | i ∈ [1, . . . ,K]. (12)
The correlation between feature stability and entropy is a
measure for the relevance of individual features in the bio-
metric hash generation because it is a numerical valuation of
the uniqueness and constancy that is required for adequate
biometric features as pointed out in Section 1. With a total


















































































































Figure 5: Feature stability and entropy correlation.
number ofK = 50 features for our tests and di being the aver-
age deviation for feature number i as per the feature variance
test in Section 5, Si is normalized to themaximum feature de-
viation, thus can have values in the range of [0, . . . , 1], which
is also the case for the feature entropy Hi. By calculating the
product of both numbers, we receive the feature correlation
values Ci as shown in the histogram of Figure 5.
In order to determine suitable features for the biometric
hash, we classify features according to their significance ac-
cording to the following scheme:
(i) no significance: CI = 0,
(ii) low significance: 0 < Ci < 0.25,
(iii) medium significance: 0.25 ≤ Ci < 0.5,
(iv) high significance: 0.5 = CI .
The classification summary in Table 5 displays that there is a
clear threshold between the 7 features with high andmedium
significance (n1,n3,n46,n45,n44,n43,n26) and the best feature
in the low-significance class n9. This leads us to the con-
clusion that these features are most suitable amongst the 50
tested for our application of biometric hashes. All 7 features
are based on time variant information; however, only n3, the
sample count, has a linear relation to the writing signal. All
other features are second order, based on combined temporal
and spatial information.
8. EVALUATIONON EXTENDEDDATA SETS
Although the initial evaluation presented in the previous sec-
tions confirms the feasibility of feature evaluation in princi-
ple, the underlying initial data set is too small to justify signif-
icant conclusions. Furthermore, during the initial test, where
both signal capturing and data processing were performed
on a computationally slow handheld computer, it has turned
out that tests on larger data sets could not be performed in
reasonable time. Therefore, methods for the biometric hash
have been migrated to a PC platform using Object Pascal,
and additional tests have been performed on reasonably per-
formant Windows 2000 PC (1.7GHz, 512MB RAM).
Data sets used for these extended tests are subsets from a
handwriting verification database, which has been collected
in an educational environment over a period of three years,
containing 5829 signatures from 60 writers obtained from
various digitizer tablet devices, as can be seen from Table 6.
The only limitation compared to the initial test set from
Section 5 is the number of features that has been imple-
mented on the new platform, which at the time of publi-
cation were 36 of the originally 50-dimensional feature set
presented in Table 1. The remaining feature set (see Table 7)
was considered to be reasonable to evaluate, particularly as
for some of the missing features from the original set, it can
be assumed that they are highly correlated (e.g., n26 and n27
with n5, n28 with n9 and n10) as they are linearly depen-
dent due to the nature of their determination. Additionally,
with the extended database, we have the advantage of a first
hardware independent analysis of the algorithm, as sample
features originating from various diﬀerent digitizer devices
are included.
Based on this extended data set, samples were taken from
all devices shown in Table 7 while the evaluation methodol-
ogy was chosen identically to the initial approach described
in Sections 5, 6, and 7 with the following adoptions:
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Table 5: Feature significance classification.
Significance high Significance medium Significance low Significance 0 Feature number Correlation Description
X n1 0.67462039 Segment count
X n3 0.501734511 Sample count
X n46 0.499881971 Average radiant
X n45 0.440496027 Cumulated radiant
X n44 0.274043819 Integral error sign y
X n43 0.314424886 Integral error sign x
X n26 0.286563794 Delta X
X n9 0.078190808 X-velocity
X n7 0.027517839 X-integral
X n6 0.030396689 Pen-up pen-down ratio
X n50 0.03764345 Average y-position
X n5 0.061011774 Aspect ratio
X n49 0.025678147 Average x-position
X n48 0.038058075 Average distance
X n47 0.051751071 Cumulated distance
X n41 0.03706768 Cumulated integral error x
X n4 0.080758321 Maximum count
X n27 0.148098756 Delta Y
X n25 0.068807745 Path length
X n2 0.012428692 Duration
X n14 0.046557959 Y-distribution velocity
X n13 0.074828997 X-distribution velocity
X n12 0.125008667 Y-acceleration
X n11 0.040800259 X-acceleration
X n10 0.085432856 Y-velocity
X n8 0 Y-integral
X n15 0 Segmented x-area 1
X n16 0 Segmented x-area 2
X n17 0 Segmented x-area 3
X n18 0 Segmented x-area 4
X n19 0 Segmented x-area 5
X n20 0 Segmented y-area 1
X n21 0 Segmented y-area 2
X n22 0 Segmented y-area 3
X n23 0 Segmented y-area 4
X n24 0 Segmented y-area 5
X n28 0 Eﬀective average speed
X n29 0 Pixel count segment 1/12
X n30 0 Pixel count segment 2/12
X n31 0 Pixel count segment 3/12
X n32 0 Pixel count segment 4/12
X n33 0 Pixel count segment 5/12
X n34 0 Pixel count segment 6/12
X n35 0 Pixel count segment 7/12
X n36 0 Pixel count segment 8/12
X n37 0 Pixel count segment 9/12
X n38 0 Pixel count segment 10/12
X n39 0 Pixel count segment 11/12
X n40 0 Pixel count segment 12/12
X n42 0 Cumulated integral error y
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Table 6: Test set size of the extended database by tablet type.
Tablet name Count (signatures)
Aiptek Hyperpen 8000 9
Palm Vx 447
EIZO Flexscan Touchscreen 18′′ 1118
Wacom 1 serial 621
Wacom Cintiq 15 1284
Wacom Intuos 2 547
Wacom Intuos 2 Inkpen 31
Wacom 1 USB 971
Wacom Valito 801
Table 7: Feature parameters evaluated from the extended test set.
Parameter name Index Param. Description
Segment count 1 n1 Number of pen-down events
Duration 2 n2 Total writing duration in ms
Sample count 3 n3 Total number of samples
Aspect ratio 5 n5 x/y ratio of the writing image times 1000
Pen-up pen-down ratio 6 n6 Ratio of total pen-up and total pen-down times multiplied by 1000
X-integral 7 n7 Total area covered by the absolute x signal
Y-integral 8 n8 Total area covered by the absolute y signal
X-velocity 9 n9 Average absolute writing velocity in x direction
Y-velocity 10 n10 Average absolute writing velocity in y direction
X-distribution velocity 13 n13 Maximum x-distribution Max(x)−Min(x) over total writing time
Y-distribution velocity 14 n14 Maximum y-distribution Max(y)−Min(y) over total writing time
Segmented x-areas 15–19 n15–n19 x-integral of 5 segments of equal length TTotal/5
Segmented y-areas 20–24 n20–n24 y-integral of 5 segments of equal length TTotal/5
Path length 25 n25 Total path length of writing trace in pixel
Pixel count 12-segment 29–40 n29–n40 Number of pixels in each 4 by 3 sector
Average x position 49 n49 Average of all x sample values
Average y position 50 n50 Average of all y sample values
(i) semantic class (s ∈ [signature]);
(ii) number of users is g ∈ [1, . . . , 54];
(iii) the selection of samples was implemented by drawing
10 sets of e = 6 enrollment samples and 10− e = 4 test
samples minus for each user ug and each tablet type
from the database in a pseudorandom manner.
Due to the large number of samples for some users in the ex-
tended database, disallowing an exhaustive evaluation of all
enrollment/test set pairs, the approach of pseudorandom se-
lection was chosen to reasonably limit the number of trials.
Results of deviation and entropy analysis of the extended test
are presented in Figures 6a, 6b. Furthermore, Figure 7 visu-
alizes the comparison of correlation between feature entropy
and deviation between the initial tests as per Figure 5 and the
results of the extended database in ascending order for the
later factors.
Correlation factors from the extended test show a statis-
tical characteristics with a means value of µExtended = 0.175
and standard deviation of sExtended = 0.133 as compared to
the initial correlation factor distribution with µInitial = 0.048
and sExtended = 0.137 for the feature set evaluated in the ex-
tended test. This indicates an overall increase of significance
of the values (note that the standard deviation has changed
insignificantly) over a set of several digitizer devices and us-
ing signature as writing semantics. Furthermore, it can be
observed that amongst the five features showing the highest
correlation in the extended data set (n43,n3,n5,n32,n1), all
except n5 have been classified as high or medium significant
in Section 7. A plausible explanation for n5 (representing the
aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that
as compared to the initial test, only signature samples were
taken into account, showing a higher stability in image lay-
out as compared to semantics written with a lower degree
of routine. Another interesting observation is the ranking of
the correlation of segmented pixel count features n31 = 0.32
and n32 = 0.44, which are both well noticeable above the
standard deviation in the distribution of the extended test,
while both features resulted in a correlation value of 0 in the
initial test.







































































































































































Figure 6: Sorted feature deviation histogram and relative entropy determined from extended test database. (a) Feature value deviations
extended test. (b) Relative feature entropy of initial test based on H(n19) = 3, 61.
























































































Figure 7: Comparison between stability-entropy correlation of initial and extended databases.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this article, we have presented a new method to evalu-
ate a given biometric authentication algorithm, the biometric
hash, by analyzing the features taken into account. We have
presented test results from two diﬀerent data sets of quite
diﬀerent size and origin and introduced three measures for
feature evaluation: intrapersonal feature deviation, interper-
sonal entropy of hash value components, and the correlation
between both. Based on this basic idea, we resulted in an ini-
tial perception that on a very specific device, a PDA, 7 out of
50 investigated features can be classified as high or medium
significant.
As the first results indicated the suitability of our ap-
proach, we have performed tests on a significantly extended
database in order to get more general and statistically more
relevant conclusions. Three main conclusions can be derived
from the second test:
(i) with a few exceptions, all of the features showing high
significance in the initial test have been reconfirmed;
(ii) entropy of hash values increases over a large set of dif-
ferent tablets as compared to the PDA device; all fea-
tures have shown nonzero entropy in the extended test;
(iii) feature scattering appears to be rather high on PDA de-
vices as compared to the average over the set of various
tablets.
The evaluation data set presented in this work is the largest
data set used for a feature analysis of dynamic handwriting
based on signature and other semantic classes that could be
found in the literature. In [16], a number of 10 diﬀerent se-
mantic classes for writer verification has been suggested and
tested with 20 diﬀerent users; however, this work limits ob-
servations on results in terms of false acceptance rate (FAR)
and false rejection rate (FRR) and does not analyze variabil-
ity within feature classes. Due to the total size of our tests,
we consider our findings as statistically significant, opening
many areas for future work, where we plan to concentrate on
three main aspects: algorithm optimization, additional tests
including feature benchmarking, and applications.
Ourmain working direction will aim to optimize the bio-
metric hashing technique under operational conditions for
specific applications, including boundary estimates for the
theoretically achievable key space and the extension of fea-
ture candidate sets. Also, it will be necessary to perform de-
tailed quantitative analysis of additional semantic classes. Es-
pecially the classes of pass phrases and numeric codes are of
great interest, as they will allow design of applications in-
cluding user authentication based on knowledge and being.
There is also room for improvement in the interval-matching
algorithm. The tolerance value introduced in (3) is esti-
mated based on statistical tests over all users and all seman-
tic classes. Here, we are working on adoptive, user-specific
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tolerance value determination rather than a global estima-
tion. Although there is no security threat the IM, as it does
not allow reverse-engineering of the full biometric template,
there still is the problem of enrollment and storing this in-
formation for each user individually. To overcome this po-
tential objective for real-world applications, we are working
towards mechanisms to determine a biometric hash without
any a priori parameters based on the individual.
Based on the introduced three statistical measures, it is
also interesting from the discipline of feature selection re-
search to perform feature selection benchmarks by compar-
ing FAR and FRR, based on diﬀerent feature sets. Here, it will
be necessary to determine competing feature sets based on
the method presented in this paper and a selection of other
published feature evaluation approaches of diﬀerent nature.
A comparison of verification and recognition results for the
biometric hash algorithm, parameterized with these diﬀerent
feature sets, will allow conclusions in regard to the impact of
feature selection on recognition accuracy.
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